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ABSTRACT 
Far from being a natural kind, ‘emotion’ turns out to be a conventional label that 
captures quite diverse phenomena; and such phenomena can no longer be relegated, as 
the ideology of  passions suggested, to a ‘lower’ and ‘primitive’ psychic sphere, which 
threatens the nobility of  ‘the thinking thing’. They belong to the unlevelled universe 
to which all psychological events belong. In general, cognitive sciences have brought 
to light the heterogeneity not only of  emotions, but also of  what is traditionally 
meant by ‘reason’. The experimental investigation of  rationality and reasoning by the 
cognitive sciences has shown that there is no unitary cognitive sphere. There is instead 
a toolbox of  imperfect analytic and operative tools that is heterogeneous and 
scattered, and consequently lacks the hierarchical structure that, according to the 
Cartesian model, culminated in self-conscious rationality. Thus, a paradigm shift is 
underway. Some research areas in cognitive sciences adopt a Baconian logic, in which 
errors and self-deceptions are seen as intrinsic to the ordinary cognitive-affective 
processes. Therefore, whereas in Freud the naive subject normally deceives herself  
because she is unable to accept the presence, deep down, of  ‘inadmissible’ sexual and 
aggressive drives, in a dynamic psychology informed by the renewal of  the traditional 
psychological categories outlined above, intrinsically defensive cognitive-affective 
mechanisms become the principles that rule over the construction of  everyday reality. 
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Introduction 
 
According to the ‘pyramidal’ conception – which is historically associated 
with the hierarchical conception of  cerebral functions dating back to the 
19th Century – the architecture of  the mind consists in a gradual ascent 
from ‘lower’ psychological levels (instinctive drives, tensions, animal 
automatisms and, more recently, ‘reptilian’ anatomical structures) 
through increasingly ‘higher’ psychological levels, up to a vertex that is 
able to impart order to this hierarchy of  functions, and above all that is 
able coherently direct the ‘noblest’ functions that define rational self-
consciousness (cf. Oatley, 1978). This ‘Victorian’1 picture of  the 
neurocognitive architecture is still very popular – for instance, it underlies 
the “dual-system view”, which has guided much research on human 
emotion over the past decades (cf. De Oliveira-Souza, Moll, & Grafman, 
2011).  
 It will be argued here, however, that this picture should be rejected. 
The main problem with the pyramidal conception of  the mind is that 
it misleads us in positing the existence of  increasingly ‘higher’ 
psychological levels that reach a hypothetical vertex on which everything 
depends. Today, we have sufficient evidence that this vertex does not 
exist. A large amount of  neurocognitive data offer robust evidence 
against the hypothesis that, in some area of  the mind-brain, there is a 
place where “it all comes together” – some sort of  central executive 
system coordinating all the cognitive operations (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 
1992). Actually, a ‘modularist’ conception of  the mind-brain has loomed 
large in psychology and neuroscience since the 1980s. In contrast with the 
pyramidal view, which sees the mind as a homogeneous and 
hierarchically-ordered field ruled by consciousness and rationality, 
Chomsky and Marr famously envisioned a much less unitary, 
homogeneous, and hierarchical mind with a largely modular architecture, 
comprising a swarm of neurocomputational subsystems that perform 
highly specific functions independently of  each other (cf. Carruthers, 
2006). Along the same lines, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (see, 
e.g., Dehaene and Changeux, 2004) sees the neurocognitive architecture 
underlying the unity of  consciousness as a distributed computational 
system with no central controller. 
                                                            
1 “Victorian Brain” is a phrase coined by Reynolds (1981). 
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Furthermore, a Cartesian epistemology is part and parcel of  the 
pyramidal conception of  the mind. According to Descartes, rational 
consciousness can fail only because of  the influence of  emotional and 
affective motions that originate from the opacity of  the bodily machine. 
However, today some research programs in cognitive sciences adopt a 
‘Baconian’ logic instead. In the Novum Organum Bacon sees the errors of  
judgment and conduct as naturally produced by the conscious and 
rational mind. The famous idola, constant factors of  deception, are, in 
this philosopher, human knowledge’s habitual way of  operating: ”Human 
understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, 
distorts and discolours the nature of  things by mingling its own nature 
with it”, Bacon famously writes (1620, Bk I, 41). In current terms, he 
sees the mind’s errors, illusions, and self-deceptions as inherent to the 
very mechanisms of  ‘high’ cognition. 
We think that Bacon’s criticism of  rational consciousness should be a 
fixed point for the sciences of  mind and brain. In the following pages we 
examine some of  its ramifications in three research areas – the study of  
emotions, psychology of  thought and the literature on the interpersonal 
and social dynamics – to finally draw a moral for the psychodynamics of  
defences. 
 
 
1. The Heterogeneity of  the Emotions 
  
If  we give up Descartes’ theory of  error, and thus cease to divide the 
mind into lower and upper floors, the folk concept of  emotion breaks 
apart, being replaced by a diversified, articulated, disparate and even 
heterogeneous field, which, contrary to the traditional ideology, is part 
and parcel of  the wider universe of  all psychological events. In other 
words, the folk concept of  emotion turns out to be not a natural kind, i.e., 
a real category in nature tied together by a causal homeostatic 
mechanism that underlies projectibility and inductive reasoning (cf. 
Boyd, 1991). 
The claim that emotions do not form a natural kind has been made 
by Griffiths (1997, 2004, 2013), based on a large amount of  evidence from 
ethology, psychology, neuroscience and anthropology. According to 
Griffiths, the folk concept of  emotion is a cluster of  at least three 
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different classes of  psychological phenomena: basic emotions, complex 
emotions, and disclaimed action emotions. Let us examine them in turn. 
Paul Ekman’s psychoevolutionary theory of  emotions aims to offer a 
unitary account of  a number of  ‘basic’ emotions by positing an 
underlying causal mechanism. That is, these emotions are characterized 
by specific physiological, neurobiological, expressive, behavioural, 
cognitive, and phenomenological responses to events in the environment; 
and these responses are assumed to be automatically elicited and 
coordinated by a computational mechanism called the ‘affect program’ 
(Ekman & Cordaro, 2011, p. 365). According to Griffiths (1990), the 
computational psychology of  these affect programs is modular in a sense 
very close to that popularized by Fodor. Basic emotions are fast and 
mandatory responses, which are controlled by subsystems that draw on a 
limited database, are triggered by information coming from an extremely 
limited range of  perceptual inputs, and work independently of  more 
conceptual processes, such those underlying action planning. In Fodor’s 
words, they are ‘informationally encapsulated’ and have ‘limited central 
access’. In emergency conditions, facing serious danger, the modular 
features permit the affect program to work as a fail-safe system, which 
seizes behaviour when, having little time, it is crucial for the agent 
immediately to do the right thing, even at the price of  trusting quick and 
dirty knowledge. 
It is important to make clear that, in a research program that aspires 
to be scientific, basic emotions should not be designated by such folk 
terms as ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, ‘happiness’, and ‘sadness’. These folk 
categories do not designate basic emotions in the sense of  the 
psychoevolutionary theory: indeed, some of  these categories lack those 
physiological, neurobiological, expressive, behavioural, cognitive, and 
phenomenological features that Ekman regards as the markers of  a basic 
emotion. And yet some members of  the ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘disgust’, 
‘happiness’, and ‘sadness’ categories do meet Ekman’s criteria – one 
example is the kind of  fear produced by sudden loss of  support (cf. 
Öhman and Mineka, 2001). Consequently, as an alternative to the use of  
folk terms, we could coin neologisms (e.g., ‘threat-coping system’), or use 
modified versions of  the folk categories, making it clear that what is 
referred to is not the whole folk category, but only a part of  it (e.g., fearb 
or fearbasic) (cf. Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011, p. 449). 
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Their mandatory, fast and passive character makes affect programs 
candidates for reference of  some folk emotion concepts. However, folk 
psychology also recognizes other types of  emotion which are much more 
cognitively complex than basic emotions. These are the complex emotion 
episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, 
episodes involving guilt, resentment, envy, shame, jealousy, loyalty, 
embarrassment, etc. There are good reasons to hold that, contrary to 
what some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; 
Pinker, 1997) have claimed, such complex emotions rest on psychological 
mechanisms that are different from the affect programs. For the latter 
have a number of  salient features that the complex emotions lack, and 
vice versa. On the input side, complex emotions are sensitive to a much 
wider range of  information than the encapsulated affect programs. Thus 
they cannot be triggered as one would predict by assimilating them to 
affect programs.2 Moreover, on the output side, complex emotions are 
responses that fail to display stereotypical physiological effects, persist 
longer, and are much more integrated with cognitive activity such as 
long-term planning.3 
However, the general category of  emotion subsumes a third kind of  
psychological state: disclaimed actions modelled on emotion. James R. 
Averill’s defines an emotion as “a transitory social role (a socially 
constituted syndrome) that includes an individual’s appraisal of  the 
situation, and is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action.” (1980, 
p. 312) A social role is a characteristic pattern of  behaviour found in a 
particular social context. One example is the social role that a person 
plays after being elected to Parliament: members of  Parliament enter a 
network of  social practices in which they play a particular role. The role 
that they play is relatively enduring and overt, in the sense that everyone 
agrees that being a member of  Parliament means being treated in a 
                                                            
2 “If  Othello’s sexual jealousy had been an affect program or a downstream cognitive 
effect of  such a program, he would have had to catch Desdemona in bed with Cassio, 
or at least have seen the handkerchief, before his jealousy was initiated.” (Griffiths, 
1997, p. 117). 
3 This is a central aspect in Frank’s (1988) sociobiological theory of  moral emotions: 
here complex emotions are short-term irrational responses designed to keep the agent 
rational in the long term. E.g., loyalty would often be conducive to long-term 
cooperation rather than short-term defection in social interactions that have the 
structure of  an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
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certain way. But in the case of  the socially constructed emotional states 
the social roles become transitory and covert. These roles are transitory 
because people play them exclusively in short-lived and stressful 
situations. They allow a behaviour that would be unacceptable in other 
circumstances – i.e., in these cases the passive character that is ordinarily 
ascribed to strong emotions and to sudden passions (love or aggressive) is 
exploited to avoid responsibility for the action. The individual ‘disclaims’ 
his or her action and the emotional state – being experienced as an 
objective rather than a subjective event, i.e. something that is not 
produced by the mind but that simply ‘happens’ – is imputed to casual 
bodily accidents or is perceived as an effect of  being ‘possessed’ by some 
force or entity that comes from the outside. Moreover, such roles are covert 
in the sense that they take shape only insofar as society does not 
recognize either their function or the social practices including these roles. 
A paradigm example of  a socially constructed state is a state like amok, a 
violent frenzy found in southeast Asian cultures. 
Thus, disclaimed action emotions differ from basic and complex 
emotions not only because they are culturally local, but also by virtue of  
their psychological mechanisms. They are unconscious attempts to take 
advantage of  the special status usually accorded to emotions because of  
their passivity. This means that their etiology involves the mechanisms 
that subserve social cognition rather than the perceptual mechanisms 
underlying basic emotions or the conceptual mechanisms that subserve 
complex emotions.  
To sum up, the folk concept of  emotion is a cluster concept, which 
does not pick out a natural kind that can be used to ground inductions or 
projections across the range of  emotions. The collection of  features we 
think characterize emotions are explained by various causal mechanisms 
in different cases. Basic emotions are psychological states involving 
isolated modules; complex emotions are special adaptations of  higher-
level cognition. Building a theoretical category based on the similarities 
between these two classes of  mental phenomena would not be justified by 
any promising explanatory project. As to the disclaimed action emotions, 
they are manifestations of  a higher cognitive activity, viz. the 
understanding and manipulation of  social relations. Consequently, they 
cannot be placed in a single category with the other emotions because 
they are essentially pretenses: “[i]t would be like putting ghost possession 
in the category of  parasitic diseases.” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 245) What 
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follows is the conclusion anticipated at the beginning of  this section: our 
concept of  emotion gathers quite diverse phenomena under a single 
conventional label.  Further, it is to be noticed that all these phenomena 
can no longer be relegated, as the ideology of  passions suggested, to a 
‘lower’ and ‘primitive’ psychic sphere, which threatens the nobility of  
‘the thinking thing’; quite legitimately, they belong to the wider universe 
of  all mental events. 
 
 
2. Rationality and Reasoning 
 
To consider the issue from the other side, cognitive sciences have brought 
to light the heterogeneity not only of  emotions but of  what is 
traditionally meant by ‘reason’ as well. That is, the human mind, even in 
its most rational aspects, is a heterogeneous repertoire of  analytical and 
operative tools that, in some circumstances, spontaneously produce 
errors. A quick reference to some key positions in psychology of  thought 
will allow us to give substance to this Baconian picture of  human 
rationality. 
Let us begin from the very well-known heuristics and biases program 
(see the classic Kahneman et al., 1982). Human inferential performances 
are seen here as driven not so much by the normative principles of  
rationality established by deductive logic, mathematical statistics and 
expected utility theory,  but rather by heuristics, viz. cheap and effective 
but not systematic problem-solving strategies. That a heuristic is not 
systematic means that its application can lead to the solution of  a 
problem, but does not ensure the constant attainment of  such a result; for 
sometimes the same heuristic can give rise to performances that deviate 
from those attainable by means of  the application of  normative 
principles. Thus the biases originating  in the activation of  one or more 
heuristics are the measure of  the gap between the real performance and 
the normatively correct one. This has led a number of  researchers to 
pessimism: the human mind is not equipped with “the correct programs 
for many important judgmental tasks”; human beings have not had “the 
opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of  dealing conceptually with 
uncertainty.” (Slovic et al., 1976, p. 174) The cognitive tools available to 
someone who has not been trained in formal disciplines are only 
normatively problematic heuristics – an interpretation of  the errors made 
MARIO DE CARO & MASSIMO MARAFFA 
567 
 
in reasoning experiments called the “Bleak Implications hypothesis” by 
Samuels et al. (1999). 
This pessimistic interpretation has been challenged by Gerd 
Gigerenzer, who points out that heuristics cannot be evaluated according 
to the standards of  normative rationality. In this perspective, the 
heuristics and biases program incorporates both a strong and a weak 
element (cf., e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 2011). The strength consists in 
incorporating Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality perspective, according 
to which the real agent, due to the limits of  its computational capacity, is 
not an optimizer but rather a satisficer.  By contrast, the weak element of  
the program is its unilateral focus on the negative aspects of  heuristics. 
Conversely, Gigerenzer highlights their virtues: our ancestors left us “an 
adaptive toolbox”, which includes a collection of  fast and frugal 
heuristics well adapted to some (physical and social) environments but 
not to others. In virtue of  this adaptation, these heuristics need 
minimum time and little knowledge to make inferences and decisions 
according to an ecological rationality that allows us to reject the Bleak 
Implications hypothesis. 
Gigerenzer’s theory of  smart heuristics, however, has been criticized 
by advocates of  the already cited ‘dual-system’ or ‘dual-processing’ 
accounts of  reasoning (cf. Evans and Frankish, 2009). According to this 
family of  theories, the human cognitive system is composed of  at least 
two subsystems. System 1 (‘intuitive’) is fast, parallel, unconscious, isn’t 
easily altered, is universal, impervious to verbal instruction, (partly) 
heuristic-based, and (mostly) shared with other animals.  By contrast, 
System 2 (‘reflective’) is slow, serial, conscious, malleable, variable (by 
culture and individual), responsive to verbal instruction, influenced by 
normative belief, and can involve application of  valid rules.  On this 
perspective, the main shortcoming of  the fast and frugal heuristics theory 
lies in the unilateral focus on the automatic and unconscious processes of  
System 1, which leads to neglect the higher processes associated with 
System 2. A comprehensive account of  the human mind’s workings and 
rationality, dual-system theorists argue, needs an in-depth analysis of  
both systems, as well as of  their forms of  interaction in terms of  both 
competition and cooperation. 
In light of  what we have just said, one might form the impression 
that dual-system theories have ended up restoring  the division between 
low and high levels of  the psyche established by the Cartesian model of  
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the relationship between reason and passions. But this would be a 
mistake.  
First of  all, it is difficult to see the evolutionary plausibility of  two 
cognitive systems implemented in distinct neural subsystems: Why on 
earth would evolution start anew with System 2 rather than modifying, 
expanding or integrating the architecture of  the pre-existing System 1? 
This sort of  objection led Frankish (2009) to put forward the hypothesis 
that System 2 is realized within System 1, i.e., there are not two separate 
systems, but two levels or layers of  cognitive processes, one dependent on 
the other.  On this perspective, it is not necessary to suppose that 
evolution generated System 2 by massively upgrading the architecture of  
System 1; it may suffice to imagine that the subsystems underlying 
System 1 have been orchestrated and used in new ways. 
Moreover, we can definitely admit the reality of  the distinction 
between intuitive and reflective processes of  reasoning; and we can accept 
also Frankish’s hypothesis that reflective reasoning is largely realized in 
cycles of  operation of  unconscious intuitive processes (including the 
subsystems that are typically associated with System 1). This is not, 
however, a vindication of  the System 1/System 2 distinction, since the 
latter does not map onto the distinction between intuitive and reflective 
reasoning. Let us consider reflective reasoning: it is easy to show that in 
some contexts reflection does not improve but rather impairs 
performance; that there are some tasks where reliance on intuitive 
reasoning is best; and that reflective reasoning can also employ heuristics. 
As to intuitive systems, some can be slow, some can be controlled, and 
some can approach the highest normative standards. In brief, as 
Carruthers (forthcoming) argued, the System 1/System 2 distinction is 
not a natural border and should be abandoned.4 
In conclusion, the psychological investigation of  rationality and 
reasoning tells us that in the case of  rationality, as in that of  emotions, 
there is no unitary cognitive sphere; there is instead a repertoire (a 
toolbox) of  imperfect analytic and operative tools, which is heterogeneous 
                                                            
4 “If  one of  the goals of  science is to discover what natural kinds there are in the 
world – in the sense of  homeostatic property clusters with unifying causal etiologies 
[…] – then cognitive scientists would be well-advised to abandon the System 1 / 
System 2 conceptual framework. The human mind is messier and more fine-grained 
than that.” (Carruthers, forthcoming, p. 21 of  the web version: 
<http://faculty.philosophy.umd.edu/pcarruthers/>). 
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and scattered, and thus lacking the hierarchical structure, culminating in 
self-conscious rationality, that was assumed by the Cartesian model. 
 
 
3. Psychological Defences 
 
We have thus seen that the cognitive science research work on emotion 
and thought provides us with the tools to deconstruct the ideology of  the 
conflict between reason and the passions. The phenomena that folk 
psychology labels as ‘emotional’ can no longer be relegated, as the 
ideology of  the passions suggested, to a ‘low’ and ‘primitive’ psychic 
sphere, which threatens the nobility of  ‘the thinking thing’; rather, quite 
legitimately, all those phenomena belong to the wider universe of  all 
mental events. The factors of  error are inherent in rationality, or rather 
immanent in that hodge-podge of  procedures and abilities into which our 
bounded rationality can be decomposed. 
This leads us to a radically new interpretation of  the psychoanalytic 
idea that self-consciousness is a construction packed with self-deceptions 
and bad faith. In the Baconian perspective, Jervis (1993) notices, the 
aspects of  ambiguity, self-deception, and suffering of  human life can no 
longer be conceived  in the way that much of  the philosophical tradition 
has viewed them, namely, as the crisis of  a fundamentally rational agent, 
temporarily overwhelmed by the perturbing influence of  affects and 
sentiments. These aspects can now be conceived as globally constitutive 
dimensions of  the mind and conduct. This  reinforces an overturning of  
the psychoanalytic questioning about defences: what we now have to ask 
ourselves is not how and why some defensive mechanisms exist, but 
rather if  it is not the case that all the structures of  knowledge and action 
around which everyday life is structured serve defensive functions.5 
Here, then, we grasp something that is already in Freud but which 
the Cartesian framework of  instinctual drives prevented him from 
                                                            
5 Jervis argues that just as nowadays we start  by asking how consciousness, rather 
than the unconscious, is possible, or we ask not how behaviors that contradict our 
intention can exist but, on the contrary, if  ever deliberate and voluntary behavior 
exists, so, in the same way, “in examining the construction of  the everyday life we 
need to explain not how and why some ‘defensive’ mechanisms exist, but rather how 
all the structures of  knowledge and action are by themselves, integrally, a matter of  
defenses.” (1993, p. 301, transl. in Marraffa, 2011). 
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articulating fully: the defensive processes are much more than bulwarks 
against anxieties and insecurities that perturb the order of  our inner life; 
they are the primary instruments for establishing order in the mind; they 
are the very structure of  the mind – the Freudian ego itself  is a defence. 
In this theoretical framework, dynamic psychology joins forces with 
interpersonal and social psychology. The defence of  self-image (closely 
linked to the self-defensive use of  causal attribution), the social attitudes 
in general and the stereotypes and prejudices in particular, and the 
rationalizing handling of  cognitive dissonance are the building blocks of  
an interpersonal and social reality packed with systematic errors or, as 
Freud would have put it, interested self-deceptions. And all these 
structures of  self-deception are defensive constructions that spring from 
mental operations in which the cognitive aspect cannot be separated from 
the affective. To illustrate, we will briefly focus on the construct of  
prejudice. 
‘Knowing’ – as well as ‘making sense’ – is primarily a pragmatic 
matter, a ‘knowing how to do things’. In the context of  everyday life an 
object makes sense for me, and it is known by me, because I place it in a 
pragmatic context, insofar as I consider it within a repertoire of  
competences: I have done something with this object in the past and I 
can do something with it in the future.  Nevertheless there is inherent in 
the very idea of  ‘knowing how to do’ an organization of  the world 
according to differentiations and hierarchies. All of  us, in forming more 
or less complex behavioural patterns, act according to gradients of  
involvement and interest. Basically, we assign different ‘values’ to single 
objects and to different aspects of  our behaviour itself.6 The panorama of  
reality takes shape then in accordance with our interests for objects, viz. 
according to the value that we assign to the surroundings:  
                                                            
6 ‘Values’ are to be understood here as simple differences of  importance, i.e. of  
priority, in the context of  the general theme of  adaptation. There is an objectivity in 
the gradients of  value in specific contexts. In the cycle of  everyday activities animals 
organize their behavior as a function of  a limited series of  general interests 
(‘evolutionary values’) such as predator defense, foraging, defense of  rank in group 
hierarchy, reproduction: each of  these general needs dominates over specific 
behavioral patterns which from time to time are a higher priority than others, i.e. 
literally ‘they come before’ insofar as they ‘have more value’, alternating with each 
other at the top of  the agenda of  ‘the things to do’. In ethology behavioral priorities 
can be quantified by means of  game theory – cf. Maynard-Smith (1982).  
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Clusters, hierarchies of  values arise; the various areas of  reality 
are on different grades of  importance. The ‘nearer’ scenarios are 
those that we are more interested in, and are easily the object of  our 
‘positive’ planning; the more ‘distant’ scenarios are those we are less 
interested in; they are less differentiated in their internal details, and 
can more easily appear to be extraneous or even hostile. These 
variables come to be organized in the first place according to the 
phenomenological category of  ‘domesticity’, or ‘familiarity’. All of  
us tend to make a spontaneous separation between, on the one hand, 
what is ‘internal’ to a limited, ‘domestic’ social world, and hence 
‘good’ and ‘reassuring’, and where we find, as it were, a proximal 
panorama of  guaranteed values; and, on the other end, what is 
‘external’, ‘alien’, which we are less interested in, whose guaranteed 
value is lower, and where objects and events can take on negative 
tones. (Jervis, 1993, p. 331). 
 
This way of  organizing reality, and of  situating ourselves at its 
centre, is a primary way of  ‘establishing order’, which has clear affinities 
with some basic structuring categories such as ‘before-after’, ‘high-low’, 
and above all, in our case, ‘inner-outer’ and ‘near-distant’. The 
phenomenological category of  domesticity refers to the experience of  the 
world-environment as structured according to criteria of  distance and 
controllability. This is a primarily cognitive operation, but one which is 
nevertheless linked to the attribution of  emotional-evaluative 
connotations in conformity with the so-called ‘primary affects’, i.e. 
according to a basic alternative of  our dispositional orientation toward 
reality that sharply distinguishes pleasantness and unpleasantness, friend 
and foe, and thereby coming closer and going away, accepting and 
rejecting, encompassing and expelling (see the circumplex model of  affect 
in Russell, 1980, 1983). 
In animals the world tends to get organized in accordance with the 
category of  territoriality; we find, in ways that are different depending 
on the species, the den as the most protected shelter, and more outwardly 
a ‘possession zone’, an ‘exploratory zone’, and so on. In children the 
‘domestic space’ is linked to the presence of  the primary attachment 
figure: the possibility of  exploring, leaving the ‘protection zone’, appears 
to be proportional to the level of  reassurance provided by the caregiver 
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(cf. Ainsworth et al., 1978). In adults the difficulty of  leaving the 
‘domestic zone’ has been called ‘territorial anguish’ by De Martino (1951-
52), and viewed by the philosopher-ethnologist as one of  the two main 
parameters of  the feeling of  being in crisis: the spatial or geographic 
parameter as opposed to the temporal one. 
This brings us to prejudice, because its psychological dynamic 
belongs precisely to that way of  organizing reality and placing ourselves 
at its centre that we have just been sketching. That is, the dynamics of  
prejudice are part and parcel of  the ways in which we spontaneously 
systematize  material or social reality according to categories of  relevance 
and gradients of  approval and disapproval. The peculiarity of  prejudice 
consists in the fact that, whereas in most of  our basic attitudes (of  liking, 
curiosity, identification, wish, disposition to the affective bond, etc.) there 
is a (‘positive’) tendency to approach the object, in prejudice we find the 
opposite tendency to reject the object, which results in a refusal to know 
it. Now, according to the social identity theory, the dynamics of  feeling as 
though one is a member of  the ingroup is closely linked to stigmatizing 
the outgroup members as treacherous and different (see, e.g., Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986). As a result, the sentence expressing the prejudice (i.e. the 
stereotype) at the moment at which it brings discredit on ‘the others’, 
accomplishes the defensive (self-apologetic) function of  enhancing our 
self-image, providing us with a collective identity (a sense of  community), 
which is also a certificate of  nobility that ‘the others’ do not possess. 
Feeling comfortably part of  a ‘valid’ community causes us to believe in 
our inner validity. 
Thus the biasing aspect of  prejudice can be ascribed to the very ways 
in which ordinary knowledge constitutes itself. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the last section  it was argued that Freud’s view of  defence 
mechanisms must today be subjected to a radical revision. Freud’s 
investigation was still wholly within a Cartesian logic, where rational 
consciousness fails only because of  the influence of  emotional and 
affective motions originating from the opacity of  the bodily machine. 
However, if  we give up Descartes’ idea of  a non-rational psychological 
domain, crowded by passions, instincts, emotions, which can be clearly 
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demarcated from the operations of  rational consciousness, the folk 
concept of  emotion melts away. Far from being a natural kind, ‘emotion’ 
turns out to be a conventional label that captures quite diverse 
phenomena; and such phenomena can no longer be relegated, as the 
ideology of  passions suggested, to a ‘lower’ and ‘primitive’ psychic sphere, 
which threatens the nobility of  ‘the thinking thing’. They belong to the 
unlevelled universe to which all psychological events belong. 
In addition, we have also seen how cognitive sciences have brought to 
light the heterogeneity not only of  emotions, but also of  what is 
traditionally meant by ‘reason’. The experimental investigation of  
rationality and reasoning shows that in the case of  rationality, as in the 
case of  emotions, there is no unitary cognitive sphere. There is instead a 
toolbox of  imperfect analytic and operative tools that is heterogeneous 
and scattered, and consequently lacks the hierarchical structure that, 
according to the Cartesian model, culminates in self-conscious rationality. 
Thus, a paradigm shift is underway. It has been shown how some 
research areas in cognitive sciences adopt a Baconian logic, in which 
errors and self-deceptions are seen as intrinsic to the ordinary cognitive-
affective processes. Therefore, whereas in Freud the naive subject 
normally deceives herself  because she is unable to accept the presence, 
deep down, of  ‘inadmissible’ sexual and aggressive drives, in a dynamic 
psychology informed by the renewal of  the traditional psychological 
categories outlined above, intrinsically defensive cognitive-affective 
mechanisms become the principles that rule over the construction of  
everyday reality. Reason does not dominate emotions, nor vice versa. 
Rather, they work synergistically, to make us the complicated animals we 
are.7  
 
 
                                                            
7 We therefore agree with Oliveira-Souza, Moll and Grafman when they write: “Two 
paradigms have guided emotion research over the past decades. The dual-system view 
embraces the long-held Western belief, espoused most prominently by decision-
making and social cognition researchers, that emotion and reason are often at odds. 
The integrative view, which asserts that emotion and cognition work synergistically, has 
been less explored experimentally. However, the integrative view (a) may help explain 
several findings that are not easily accounted for by the dual-system approach, and 
(b) is better supported by a growing body of  evidence from human neuroanatomy 
that has often been overlooked by experimental neuroscience.” (2011, p. 310; italics 
added). 
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